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The impact of accounting standards  
on pension investment decisions 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the ‘real’ effects of accounting standards in the context of defined benefit 
pension plans. Specifically, we examine the impact of IAS 19R, which increases expected 
pension-induced equity volatility by eliminating the so-called ‘corridor method’, a smoothing 
device for actuarial gains and losses. Supported by interview evidence, we show that IAS 19R 
leads firms to reconsider their pension investment decisions. Using matched samples of 
treatment and control firms, results from multivariate difference-in-differences tests indicate 
that firms affected by the adoption of IAS 19R significantly shift their pension assets from 
equities into bonds, relative to control firms. This effect is attenuated for firms with larger and 
better funded pension plans. Supplementary analyses suggest that this shift in pension invest-
ment is mainly due to IAS 19R’s changes in the accounting for actuarial gains and losses (the 
‘OCI method’). These results are robust to several sensitivity tests, although endogeneity con-
cerns cannot be fully ruled out. Our study informs accounting standard setters and other 
stakeholders of potential shifts in firms’ real economic activities due to concerns about pen-
sion-induced equity volatility. 
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1 Introduction 
This study examines whether accounting standards influence firms’ ‘real’ investment deci-
sions regarding the allocation of pension plan assets to asset classes of different risk. Specifi-
cally, we analyze the effect of IAS 19R, which eliminated the corridor method, a smoothing 
device for recognizing actuarial gains and losses under IFRS, on the allocation of plan assets 
to equities and bonds. 
Risk from pension plans is partly driven by the allocation of plan assets. Empirical re-
search on the determinants of the pension asset allocation identifies the funding status of the 
pension plan (e.g., Bader, Leibowitz, & Brothers, 1991), taxes (e.g., Tepper & Affleck, 1974), 
regulation (e.g., Harrison & Sharpe, 1983), and the demography of pension plan participants 
(e.g., Cocco, Gomes, & Maenhout, 2005), as factors influencing pension investment deci-
sions. However, much of the cross-sectional and time-series variation in pension asset alloca-
tions remains unexplained (Rauh, 2009). In particular, evidence on the impact of accounting 
standards on pension asset allocations is limited (e.g., Kiosse & Peasnell, 2009).  
We investigate whether accounting standards influence the pension asset allocation in a 
German IFRS setting. Specifically, we use the transition from IAS 19 to IAS 19R in 2013, 
which alters the recognition of actuarial gains and losses. Under IAS 19, firms were able to 
smooth pension-induced equity volatility by deferring recognition of actuarial gains and loss-
es under the so-called ‘corridor method’. IAS 19R eliminates this smoothing device – instead 
mandating immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses in other comprehensive in-
come (the so-called ‘OCI method’). Consequently, firms that used to apply the corridor meth-
od under IAS 19 are required to adopt the OCI method under IAS 19R. This switch increases 
expected volatility of pension liabilities, equity book values, and OCI amounts.  
The German IAS 19R adoption setting has several distinct advantages that facilitate a 
difference-in-differences research design to identify whether eliminating the corridor method 
affects pension asset allocations, and how that effect varies with cross-sectional differences in 
pension plan characteristics. First, in contrast to many other IFRS jurisdictions, the German 
setting offers a sufficiently large treatment sample, as well as a group of control firms unaf-
fected by the accounting change of interest (i.e., firms that already applied the OCI method 
before IAS 19R mandated it). Second, sample firms exhibit sufficient variation in their expo-
sure to defined benefit pension plans that allows us to examine whether such exposure moder-
ates the effect of the accounting change on the pension asset allocation. Third, this single-
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country setting allows us to effectively limit potential alternative explanations for observed 
changes in pension asset allocations between treatment and control firms. 
Drawing on theory as well as interview-based evidence and firms’ public statements, we 
derive and test two empirical predictions. First, we reason that treatment firms, ceteris pari-
bus, expect their adoption of IAS 19R to increase pension-induced volatility in comprehen-
sive income amounts, equity book values, and pension liabilities. Higher levels of volatility 
could increase credit spreads (Stracke, 2013) and the likelihood of debt covenant violations. 
Pension-induced volatility can be mitigated by shifting pension assets out of asset classes that 
are volatile, and that are positively correlated with fluctuations in net pension liabilities. Ac-
cordingly, to mitigate this expected increase in volatility, we predict that, on average, treat-
ment firms reduce the portion of pension plan assets allocated to equities relative to control 
firms that already apply the OCI method. Second, we expect this effect to vary according to 
treatment firms’ exposure to pension plans and treatment firms’ pension plan funding levels.  
Univariate comparisons and multivariate regression tests support these predictions. We 
find that treatment firms significantly reduce (increase) their portion of equity (bond) invest-
ments relative to control firms after IAS 19R adoption. This finding is consistent with firms 
using the allocation of pension assets to mitigate expected volatility arising from exposure to 
pension plans. In line with the second hypothesis, we show that these effects are attenuated 
for treatment firms with exposure to larger and better-funded pension plans.  
In supplemental analyses, we further explore the source of this ‘IAS 19R effect’. Specif-
ically, in addition to changing the accounting for actuarial gains and losses (‘OCI effect’), 
IAS 19R simultaneously alters the calculation of net periodic pension expense by replacing 
the expected rate of return assumption by the discount rate assumption. Employing a differ-
ence-in-differences test that effectively isolates this ‘expected rate of return effect’ (hereinaf-
ter: ERR effect), we find evidence inconsistent with the ERR effect driving our main findings. 
These results differ from those reported in a concurrent study of Canadian firms (Anantha-
raman & Chuk, 2017), highlighting the need for careful jurisdiction-level studies, as the effect 
of (changes in) accounting standards will likely differ across countries. 
Several sensitivity analyses support the robustness of our main results. Specifically, we 
repeat the main tests using an alternative propensity-score matching approach, several alterna-
tive treatment dates and measurement windows, additional and alternatively specified control 
variables, as well as subsamples. Overall, these sensitivity analyses are consistent with the 
main findings, although some are weaker, presumably due to lower test power.  
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The contribution of this study is threefold. First, we add to the literature on accounting 
standards as a determinant of pension asset allocations (e.g., Amir & Benartzi, 1999; Amir, 
Guan, & Oswald, 2010; Anantharaman & Chuk, 2017). Our identification strategy and inter-
view evidence allow us to document a plausibly causal effect of a change in accounting stand-
ards on firms’ pension asset allocations. Second, we extend prior literature on the economic 
consequences of accounting standards. Specifically, findings are consistent with the notion 
that firms adjust their ‘real’ activities, including their investment behavior, to mitigate the 
undesired impact of recognition rules on the volatility of equity book values and other key 
financial statement items (e.g., Zhang, 2009; Choudhary, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2009). 
Third, this study also informs the ongoing deliberations on accounting standards for defined-
benefit pension plans, as it suggests that managers’ concerns about equity volatility comple-
ment widely documented concerns about earnings volatility in influencing manager behavior. 
These results also inform standard setters’ considerations regarding the future role of OCI. 
Finally, taken together with concurrent work in this field, our study highlights that the effects 
of accounting standards can vary across countries, reinforcing the need for jurisdiction-level 
analyses to understand and possibly predict these effects and their drivers. 
Section 2 provides background and develops our predictions. Section 3 explains the re-
search design and identification strategy and describes the sample and data. Section 4 presents 
the main findings, alternative analyses, and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. Supple-
mental material is included in a comprehensive Online Appendix. 
2 Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Accounting Change of Interest: IAS 19R 
2.1.1 Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension Plans under IFRS 
Firms account for their defined benefit pension plans under IAS 19 Employee Benefits (origi-
nally adopted in 1998). IAS 19R, an amendment issued in June 2011 (IFRS Foundation 
2011), alters the expected equity volatility of affected firms (i.e., the treatment group). We 
expect IAS 19R to change how treatment firms allocate their pension assets, relative to an 
unaffected control group. IAS 19R introduces two noteworthy changes: The first relates to the 
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balance sheet depiction of defined benefit plans (herein referred to as the “OCI effect”), and 
the second affects their income statement presentation (the “ERR effect”).1 
Describing these effects requires some background. The pension liability (or asset) is 
the net amount of the defined benefit obligation (DBO) and any externally funded plan assets. 
This net funded status is either a funding deficit (plan assets < DBO) or surplus (plan assets > 
DBO). IAS 19 allowed firms to recognize a net pension liability on the balance sheet that ad-
justs this net amount for any actuarial gains and losses.2 Specifically, IAS 19 provides a 
choice between three different methods of accounting for actuarial gains and losses: (1) de-
ferred recognition in profit or loss (corridor method); (2) immediate recognition in other com-
prehensive income (OCI method); and (3) immediate recognition in profit or loss.3  
2.1.2 The “OCI Effect” 
The corridor method and the OCI method differ dramatically in their effects on firms’ balance 
sheets. Under the corridor method, firms recognize actuarial gains and losses only in part, and 
only if the cumulative amount exceeds a certain threshold, commonly referred to as the ‘cor-
ridor’. Consequently, corridor method balance sheets fail to fully display pension plans’ fund-
ed status, which allows firms to largely avoid undesirable pension-induced equity volatility 
and leverage. In contrast, the OCI method requires all actuarial gains and losses to be recog-
nized when incurred, bringing the pension plan’s full funded status onto the balance sheet. Of 
note, earnings under the OCI method still do not reflect the volatility of net pension liabilities, 
as actuarial gains and losses are recognized in OCI rather than profit or loss.  
IAS 19R eliminates the corridor method (method 1 above) and immediate P&L recogni-
tion (method 3 above), making the OCI method mandatory. Therefore, the treatment group 
(control group) consists of firms using the corridor method (OCI method) before IAS 19R 
took effect. When adopting IAS 19R, treatment firms recognize their unrecognized actuarial 
                                                 
1
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for stressing that IAS 19R requires additional pension-related disclosures that 
could also influence affected firms’ de-risking behavior through a ‘real effect’ (e.g., Kanodia, 2007; Leuz & 
Wysocki, 2016). However, since these new disclosure requirements affect both treatment and control firms, our 
difference-in-differences research design should eliminate their effects. Hence, although we consider the de-
risking effects of pension disclosures to be an important research question, the present setting is not particularly 
conducive to studying them. 
2
 Actuarial gains and losses arise for DBOs and plan assets if firms experience adjustments to actuarial assump-
tions, or change these assumptions for future periods. Actuarial assumptions relating to the DBO include the 
discount rate, mortality rates, and salary trends. For example, actuarial losses (gains) result when the pension 
discount rate decreases (increases), which increases (decreases) the DBO. 
3
 Method (3) was virtually nonexistent in the initial sample (see Table 1 and Glaum, Keller, & Street, 2018). 
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gains or losses on the balance sheet.4 In subsequent periods, net pension liabilities reflect any 
actuarial gains and losses when incurred, making equity amounts and leverage ratios more 
volatile. We refer to this aspect of IAS 19R – the full recognition of actuarial gains or losses 
on the balance sheet and within OCI – as the “OCI effect” of IAS 19R. Online Appendix 1 
presents a comprehensive numerical example illustrating IAS 19R’s OCI effect. 
2.1.3 The “ERR Effect” 
The second noteworthy change in IAS 19R relates to the income statement depiction of de-
fined benefit pension plans. Income statements display a net periodic pension cost that cap-
tures service cost, interest cost, and the expected yield on plan assets. Under the original IAS 
19, interest cost was calculated by applying the pension discount rate to the DBO, whereas the 
expected asset yield reflected the expected rate of return on plan assets (ERR), given the cur-
rent asset allocation. Under IAS 19R, interest cost and the expected return on plan assets are 
combined into a net interest cost, calculated as the funded status times the discount rate. 
Where the expected rate of return on plan assets (say, 6%) exceeds the discount rate (say, 
2%), net interest cost under IAS 19R (DBO x 2% less plan assets x 2%) is larger than net in-
terest cost under the original IAS 19 (DBO x 2% less plan assets x 6%). We label this aspect 
of IAS 19R – the elimination of the expected rate of return assumption – the “ERR effect”. 
Evidence in Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) and Chuk (2013) is consistent with manag-
ers increasing risk in pension asset allocations to justify inflated ERRs, which – before IAS 
19R – directly increased reported earnings. Based on these findings, Anantharaman and Chuk 
(2017) expect and find evidence consistent with IAS 19R’s ERR causing reduced risk-taking 
in pension asset allocations for a sample of Canadian firms. 
2.1.4 Relevance of IAS 19R for the Allocation of Pension Assets 
Any ERR effect notwithstanding, we expect IAS 19R to affect firms’ pension asset allocation 
decisions through the OCI effect, which increases expected pension-induced equity volatility, 
i.e., volatility in accounting amounts and related ratios caused by the recognition of actuarial 
gains and losses in OCI and the net pension liability. Recall that the ERR effect operates 
through managers losing their incentive to invest in risky pension assets as a justification for 
inflated ERRs and higher earnings. In contrast, the OCI effect does not assume previously 
biased asset allocations. Rather, it is based on managers expecting increased equity volatility 
                                                 
4
 In 2012, treatment firms’ mean unrecognized actuarial losses were €981 million, or 10% of equity book value.  
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under IAS 19R. Whereas firms were able to avoid this volatility under the corridor method, 
IAS 19R eliminates this possibility. Furthermore, we argue that the OCI effect is of high po-
tential magnitude. For example, Volkswagen AG, the German automaker, recognized a 
€7,929b pre-tax actuarial loss in OCI in 2013, which amounts to 8.8% of book equity. The 
ERR effect, in comparison, would have amounted to roughly 0.04% of book equity.5 As fur-
ther developed in section 2.3, firms could mitigate expected pension-induced equity volatility 
by shifting investments into (1) less volatile asset classes, and/or (2) asset classes that provide 
a natural hedge against expected volatility in the defined benefit obligation.6  
2.2 Prior Literature 
By analyzing firms’ pension asset allocation decisions in response to a change in pension ac-
counting standards, this paper relates to two streams of literature: First, the ‘real effects’ liter-
ature is interested in the impact of accounting standards on firms’ ‘real’ operating, investing, 
and financing decisions (e.g., Kanodia, 2007). For example, extant findings suggest that man-
agers alter business decisions to influence accounting outcomes (e.g., Graham, Harvey, & 
Rajgopal, 2005; Chuk, 2013), and to mitigate the impact of mandated accounting changes 
(e.g., Choudhary et al., 2009; Zhang, 2009). As defined benefit pensions are economically 
large, changes in pension accounting are likely to trigger such ‘real’ effects. For example, 
Beaudoin, Chandar, and Werner (2010) show that the adoption of SFAS 158 (which also in-
troduced the OCI method) in the U.S. is associated with firms’ decisions to freeze defined 
benefit pension plans. 
Second, a series of papers in finance explain variation in pension asset allocations by 
the demographics of employees, regulation, taxation, and corporate financial policy; however, 
unexplained variation remains (e.g., Rauh, 2009). At the same time, practitioners and academ-
ics have long held that accounting standards also influence the pension asset investment strat-
egy through their effects on financial statement volatility (Kiosse & Peasnell, 2009).  
                                                 
5
 The ERR effect is difficult to calculate precisely from public disclosures. For example, Volkswagen reports 
separate discount rates and expected rates of return on plan assets for Germany versus all other countries, but 
does not provide the same disaggregation for the DBO and the fair value of plan assets. However, assuming that 
Volkswagen replaced the 2012 expected rate of return on plan assets for Germany (4.12%) with the 2013 dis-
count rate for Germany (3.70%), and applied the difference (0.42 percentage points) to the fair value of plan 
assets at the end of 2012 (€7.288b), this would have led to a pension expense that would have been higher by 
€31m, or 0.04 of book equity. Clearly, however, the magnitude of the ERR effect is driven by (1) a firm’s fair 
value of plan assets, and (2) its spread between the discount rate and the expected rate of return on plan assets. 
6
 In section 4.3, we consider whether IAS 19R’s ERR effect is associated with shifts in firms’ pension asset 
allocations. This test amounts to a replication of Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) for the German setting.  
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Several prior studies straddle these two lines of research, seeking to assess firms’ use of 
pension asset allocations to mitigate the undesired impact of changes in accounting stand-
ards.7 Amir and Benartzi (1999) suggest that firms avoid the recognition of an additional pen-
sion liability under SFAS 87 by reducing the volatility of pension assets. These inferences are 
based on cross-sectional tests that control for other known and observable determinants of the 
pension asset allocation. Amir et al. (2010) provide evidence consistent with firms changing 
their pension asset allocations to mitigate expected equity volatility from pension accounting 
changes in the U.K. and U.S. Inferences rely on pre-post comparisons of pension asset alloca-
tions around the relevant changes in accounting standards, again using control variables.8  
We complement these papers in several important ways: First, our single-country dif-
ference-in-differences research design mitigates potential concerns that omitted cross-
sectional (i.e., across-firm) or time-series (i.e., within-firm) factors could explain the observed 
effects. Second, this study is the first to provide IFRS-based insights from a Continental-
European perspective, and thus speaks to the external validity of prior work. Third, in addi-
tion to relying on archival data, we provide insights into key assumptions and mechanisms 
based on interviews with sample firms’ Chief Accounting Officers. Fourth, analyzing the per-
centage of bonds in addition to equities allows us to assess the extent to which firms not only 
shift out of risky assets, but also whether this is accompanied by a shift into another asset 
class consistent with the theoretical predictions of this literature.  
In a concurrent study, Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) investigate the ERR effect of 
IAS 19R in Canada, using U.S. firms as a control group. The authors document a reduced 
percentage of equity investments after mandatory IAS 19R adoption, in absolute terms as well 
as relative to the control group. Our study complements Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) in 
three important ways: First, whereas Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) are interested in IAS 
19R’s ERR effect, we focus on IAS 19R’s OCI effect.9 Doing so matters, as eliminating the 
corridor method, a highly salient and effective smoothing device, had an economically signif-
icant impact. Second, the German single-country setting arguably provides a cleaner control 
group relative to a cross-country design. Third, our findings suggest that German firms’ in-
                                                 
7
 These papers are complemented by several studies that document accrual earnings management in the pension 
context, typically using actuarial assumptions (e.g., Glaum, 2009 for a review). 
8
 Mashruwala (2008) reports similar findings in the U.K. setting by documenting that U.K. firms reduce equity 
allocations by approximately 8 percentage points following the introduction of FRS 17. 
9
 As discussed in section 4.3, we cannot cleanly separate the OCI and ERR effects in our main setting. However, 
we complement the main tests with alternative analyses that allow isolation of the ERR effect. (We discuss an 
empirical approach to isolating the OCI effect, but data availability constraints prevent us from implementing it.)  
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centives related to the ERR effect differ from those of Canadian firms, and that these differ-
ences seem to matter. Overall, we complement Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) and prior 
work in investigating the effect of accounting standards on firms’ pension asset allocations. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
2.3.1 Key Assumptions and Supporting Evidence 
We predict that treatment firms rebalance their pension asset allocations due to concerns 
about expected equity volatility caused by IAS 19R. This prediction, developed in section 
2.3.2 below, follows from three conditions: Treatment firms (1) expect IAS 19R to increase 
equity volatility; (2) have incentives to avoid such volatility; and (3) view plan asset realloca-
tion as an effective, efficient (i.e., relatively low-cost), and de-facto feasible countermeasure. 
In this section, we discuss theory and evidence suggesting that these conditions hold. Our 
evidence stems from two sources: (a) seven semi-structured interviews with Chief Accounting 
Officers (CAO) of sample firms10, and (b) stakeholders’ public statements and comment let-
ters to the IASB. 
Regarding condition (1), the discussion in section 2.1 and Online Appendix 1 illustrates 
the volatility-increasing effect of IAS 19R on treatment firms’ book value of equity. But were 
firms sufficiently aware of this OCI effect to be concerned? Interviewed CAOs uniformly 
indicate their clear expectation that IAS 19R would increase the volatility of equity (and, in 
the case of accumulated unrecognized actuarial losses, decrease its magnitude) for treatment 
firms. Consistent with this view, Deutsche Lufthansa AG states that “changes in the discount 
rate … and … fluctuations in the market value of plan assets, can in particular result in con-
siderable, unpredictable fluctuations in the balance sheet and shifts between equity and liabili-
ties.” Lufthansa comments as follows on the elimination of the corridor method: “the 10-per 
cent corridor rule previously used … to avoid annual fluctuations in the balance sheet will 
then no longer be allowed.” (Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 2012, both quotes). Deutsche Post AG 
also expressed concerns in relation to the immediate recognition of actuarial gains or losses 
on the balance sheet in their comment letter submitted in response to the 2010 Exposure Draft 
that led to the introduction of IAS 19R, noting: “From a conceptual viewpoint, we are not 
convinced that highlighting short-term volatility provides any additional relevant information 
                                                 
10
 Refer to Online Appendix 2 for summary information on these interviews. We present this evidence in the spirit 
of Gow, Larcker, and Reiss (2016, p. 479), which argues “that evidence on the actions and beliefs of individuals 
and institutions can bolster causal claims based on associations, even absent compelling estimates of the causal 
effects.” 
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to the reader of financial statements and may in addition lead to inefficient investment deci-
sions by entities (in order to avoid such volatility).” These expectations are echoed in audit 
firms’ publications. For example, Ernst & Young (2011, p. 3) states: “These changes will re-
sult in increased balance sheet volatility for those entities currently applying the corridor ap-
proach.” 
Condition (2) states that firms also needed to be concerned about this effect to a suffi-
cient extent for them to consider countermeasures. A first indication lies in the fact that treat-
ment firms chose not to voluntarily adopt the OCI method before it became mandatory under 
IAS 19R. Consistent with this view, an increase in firms’ volatility of comprehensive income, 
equity and liabilities affects the perception of business risk by equity investors (Jin, Merton, 
& Bodie, 2006; Chava & Purnanandam, 2010) and debtholders (Bao, Billett, Smith, & Unlu, 
2018). Another negative potential consequence is the impact on firms’ contractual arrange-
ments. For example, volatility in the book value of equity increases the likelihood of violation 
of accounting-based debt covenants (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Higher volatility of com-
prehensive income also affects retained earnings, constraining firms that link dividend pay-
outs to retained earnings.11 
Consistent with these theoretical considerations, interviewed CAOs point out that equity 
volatility and depletion are severe concerns that are distinct from concerns about earnings 
volatility. Equity volatility is considered problematic due to debt covenants that vary with the 
book value of equity (e.g., debt-to-net worth), and because of capital-market perceptions of 
default risk. These concerns are corroborated by PIMCO’s global head of credit research, who 
notes that “it’s not just about the liability – it’s about the volatility of the liability” (Stracke, 
2013). The immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses that occurs under IAS 19R 
increases the volatility of pension liabilities, which “is a critical factor in credit analysis” 
(Stracke, 2013). Moreover, Stracke (2013) claims that information previously provided in the 
notes does not sufficiently enable credit analysts to properly assess pension liabilities and 
their volatilities, suggesting that IAS 19R will render pension-induced volatility more salient 
by elevating it from pre-IAS 19R notes disclosures to recognition in the financial statements. 
Related to condition (3), there is a widespread perception among practitioners and aca-
demics that the pension asset investment strategy can affect financial statement volatility 
                                                 
11
  Whereas German corporate law restricts dividend payments to the amount of retained earnings calculated under 
German GAAP, shareholders may form expectations about dividends on the basis of published IFRS financial 
statements. Also, as indicated by one interviewee, corporate bylaws and charters occasionally make dividend 
distribution conditional on maintained minimum ratios of book value of equity to total assets. 
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(Kiosse & Peasnell, 2009).12 For example Rauh (2009) shows that incentives to limit costly 
financial distress explain some of the variation in pension asset allocations. He finds firms 
decreasing the allocation to equities when they are close to financial distress. Amir and 
Benartzi (1999) find that firms shift pension assets from equity to fixed-income securities to 
reduce the risk of recognizing an additional pension liability. Interviewed CAOs also view 
“liability-driven investment” strategies for plan assets as a proper approach to mitigating the 
equity volatility concerns raised by IAS 19R. Specifically, they consider it favorable among 
other measures of “de-risking” pension plans, such as curtailments, settlements and shifts into 
cash-balance plans, which they deem more costly and feasible only in the long-term.  
However, it is not obvious that firms can de facto influence asset allocations where pen-
sion plans are administered outside of the reporting entity. Asked directly, several CAOs re-
port that asset management committees consisting of firm managers and independent pension 
plan trustees/directors decide on asset allocation strategies. This supports the notion that firms 
have de-facto opportunities to influence pension asset allocations in the expected way. 
2.3.2 Empirical Predictions 
Against this background, the first hypothesis predicts that IAS 19R affects pension asset allo-
cations for firms applying the corridor method in the pre-IAS 19R period.13 These firms now 
adopt the OCI method, which requires immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses in 
other comprehensive income. For these firms, actuarial gains and losses now fully affect bal-
ance sheet amounts (i.e., the net pension liability and – through OCI – shareholders’ equity), 
with ripple effects on financial ratios containing either amount, in the period in which they 
occur. We refer to this effect as the ‘OCI effect’. Accordingly, we expect IAS 19R’s elimina-
tion of the corridor method to increase firms’ pension-induced equity volatility.  
How would firms reallocate their pension assets to counteract this expected OCI effect? 
The pension-induced equity volatility caused by actuarial gains and losses flowing through 
OCI potentially stems from two sources: (1) fluctuations in the DBO (which are predominant-
ly due to discount rate changes), and (2) fluctuations in plans assets. Therefore, firms have an 
incentive, first, to increase their investments in bonds, which are negatively correlated with 
                                                 
12
  Alternative (and potentially costlier, and longer-term) ways of reducing the financial statement risks of pension 
plans include settlement payments, termination/freezing of existing pension plans, and risk transfers to insurance 
companies.  
13
  Again, refer to section 2.1 for a detailed comparison of the two methods of recognizing actuarial gains and 
losses, and Online Appendix 1 for a numerical example. 
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interest rates (e.g., Amir & Benartzi 1999, Amir et al., 2010), and, second, to the extent that 
equities are more volatile than other asset classes held within plan assets (and ignoring diver-
sification effects), reduce the percentage of equities. Taken together, we hypothesize that 
treatment firms mitigate the imminent increase in pension-induced equity volatility by de-
creasing (increasing) the percentage of equities (bonds) in their pension assets: 
H1:  When adopting the OCI method under IAS 19R, treatment firms (which previously ap-
plied the corridor method) will, on average, reduce (increase) the portion of equities 
(bonds) in their pension assets, relative to control firms (which already apply the OCI 
method). 
We further expect that this ‘OCI effect’ predicted under H1 varies in the cross-section with 
firms’ defined benefit pension plan characteristics. Specifically, the volatility effect of 
IAS 19R is potentially more severe for firms with relatively large pension plans, as these 
firms are likely to have larger actuarial gains and losses, leading to higher pension-induced 
equity volatility. Furthermore, relatively larger plan assets provide larger scope for firms to 
counteract expected pension-induced equity volatility by decreasing the percentage of equities 
in their pension assets. For most firms, the magnitude of pension assets and pension obliga-
tions relative to book value of equity is considerable. Therefore, these firms could have 
stronger incentives to rebalance their pension assets as predicted under H1.  
However, shifting the relative weights of equities and bonds may be a blunt and weak 
instrument for managing expected equity volatility – especially where pension plans are large 
and funding levels are relatively low. In these cases, interviewees note that firms are likely to 
supplement other measures to counteract IAS 19R-induced equity volatility. These include 
derivatives-based hedging (which the low granularity of pension asset disclosures prohibits us 
from observing), defined benefit plan curtailments, settlements, freezes, or closures (which 
are relatively costly and therefore less likely to occur within a relatively short window around 
the mandatory adoption of IAS 19R), and cash injections into plan assets. Therefore, we make 
the following unsigned prediction: 
H2:  When adopting the OCI method under IAS 19R, treatment firms’ relative reduction 
(increase) in the portion of equities (bonds) in pension assets will, on average, vary 
with firms’ (a) exposure to pension plans and (b) level of funding deficits. 
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2.4 Institutional Setting 
The within-Germany setting provides a sufficiently large number of public firms with sub-
stantial, but varying, exposure to defined-benefit pension plans. These firms’ IFRS reporting 
is subject to a rigid enforcement mechanism (e.g., Hitz, Ernstberger, & Stich, 2012) and ex-
hibits high data quality. As only a subset of firms are affected by IAS 19R’s elimination of the 
corridor method, this setting facilitates a single-country difference-in-differences design.  
In Germany, defined benefit pension plans are funded either internally (i.e., through the 
sponsoring firm’s operating or financial assets), externally (i.e., through a separate funding 
agency that manages plan assets on the firm’s behalf), or through a combination of both. In 
the case of external funding, funding agencies invest firms’ contributions into various asset 
classes (e.g., equity instruments, bonds, real estate, or cash). Funding agencies include pen-
sion funds, contractual trust arrangements (CTAs), support funds, and insurance-like vehicles. 
Pension plan sponsors and funding agencies face numerous regulatory requirements, and the 
German setting is no exception. However, and importantly for this study, none of these re-
quirements provide plausible explanations for mean shifts in the pension asset allocations of 
treatment firms relative to control firms in the context of IAS 19R adoption.14 
3 Research Design and Data 
3.1 Identification Strategy and Regression Models 
This section explains our approach to identifying the causal effect of IAS 19R on firms’ pen-
sion plan asset allocations.  
3.1.1 Modeling the Pension Asset Allocation 
Following Amir et al. (2010), hypothesis tests rely on the following baseline regression to 
explain cross-sectional variation in the pension asset allocation: 
 
ASSET_ALLOCit = α0  + α1Levit + α2FFit + α3Sizeit + α4SDCFit + α5Fundit  
+ α6Horizonit + α7Expit + ∑ α Indit +εit   (1) 
                                                 
14
 In Online Appendix 3, we further discuss the German regulatory environment in terms of three distinct institu-
tional factors that prior studies have linked to variation in pension sponsors’ plan asset allocations: (1) re-
strictions on funding agencies’ investment strategies; (2) funding requirements and insurance; and (3) taxation. 
The purpose of that discussion is to show that these institutional factors are unlikely to explain the empirical 
patterns we observe in the context of IAS 19R adoption. 
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The dependent construct, ASSET_ALLOCit, reflects two alternative measures that char-
acterize firms’ pension asset allocations: %EQit (%BONDSit) is the percentage of pension as-
sets invested in equity securities (bonds) of firm i at the end of fiscal year t.15 Prior literature 
identifies several determinants of firms’ pension asset allocations, which are included in equa-
tion (1). First, firms with higher leverage ratios (Lev) are expected to be (on average) closer to 
violating their debt covenants, which creates incentives to decrease pension-induced equity 
volatility by investing more (less) pension assets in bonds (equities) (e.g., Mitra & Medova, 
2010). 
Second, the percentage of free float (FF) captures the presence of large blockholders. 
Findings in Faßhauer, Glaum, Keller, and Street (2011) suggest that firms with large share-
holders are more effectively monitored, which could mitigate managers’ compensation-
related incentives to promote risk taking that manifests in the pension asset investment strate-
gy (Anantharaman & Lee, 2014). We therefore expect a positive (negative) relation between 
FF and %EQ (%BONDS). 
Third, we control for firms’ business risk by introducing firm size (Size) and the varia-
bility of operating cash flows (SDCF). To the extent firms’ cash flows are positively correlat-
ed with stock returns (e.g., due to decreasing plan assets triggering cash funding requirements; 
Amir & Benartzi, 1999), firm risk increases in %EQ. Hence, we predict a negative (positive) 
relation between SDCF and %EQ (%BONDS).  Furthermore, as large firms are associated 
with lower business risk (e.g., Fama & French, 1993), we predict a positive (negative) relation 
between Size and %EQ (%BONDS). 
Fourth, prior literature also identifies pension plan funding levels as determinants of the 
pension asset allocation. Analytical research by Harrison and Sharpe (1983) suggests that 
firms should invest pension assets in equity securities if funding levels are low, increasing the 
value of the put option provided by a pension guarantee system. However, German legislation 
requires minimum funding of externally funded pension plans, which reduces the value of the 
put option. Moreover, in contrast to the theoretical prediction, Rauh (2009) and Anantha-
raman and Lee (2014) find that firms with higher funding levels allocate more pension assets 
to equity securities. We include the funding status (Fund; i.e., the fair value of plan assets 
scaled by the DBO), but due to conflicting findings in prior literature, we refrain from predict-
ing a sign.16 
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  We suppress subscripts in the subsequent text. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
16
  Alternatively, we test for a non-linear relation between Fund and %EQ as well %BONDS in section 4.4.4.   
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Fifth, we include the investment horizon of pension assets (Horizon). DBOs reflect es-
timated future payments and the discount rate. Whereas estimated future payments depend 
heavily on expected final salary levels, the discount rate reflects market yields of high-quality 
corporate bonds. Accordingly, DBOs for retirees are primarily affected by short-term interest 
rates, whereas DBOs for younger, active workforces are more strongly correlated with value 
changes in equities. Consistent with firms hedging against increases in DBOs caused by rising 
salaries (Sundaresan & Zapatero, 1997; Cocco et al., 2005), Bikker, Broeders, Hollanders, 
and Ponds (2012) find that older employees are associated with lower equity investments. 
Therefore, we predict a positive (negative) relation between Horizon and %EQ (%BONDS). 
Sixth, consistent with our reasoning in section 2.3.2, we control for the exposure of 
firms’ book value of equity to the size of the pension plan (Exp), measured as the ratio of pen-
sion assets to book value of equity.17 We refrain from predicting a sign for this relation.  
Finally, equation (1) is estimated including a set of 11 industry indicator variables (Ind). 
3.1.2 Identifying the IAS 19R Effect 
We adopt the difference-in-differences research design illustrated in Figure 1 to test our pre-
dictions. Specifically, we measure the effect of mandatory IAS 19R adoption on the pension 
asset allocation by comparing differences in pension asset allocations between a treatment 
group affected by IAS 19R and an unaffected control group across the pre- and post-IAS 19R 
periods. This design helps us isolate the causal IAS 19R effect by excluding time-invariant 
factors and time-series mean shifts affecting both groups. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Whereas treatment firms switch from the corridor method to the OCI method under 
IAS 19R, control firms already used the OCI method and are therefore unaffected. To quanti-
fy the effect of mandatory IAS 19R adoption on the pension asset allocation, we first measure 
the difference in the percentages of equities and bonds, %EQ and %BONDS, between the two 
groups before the transition to IAS 19R (effect 1 in Figure 1). In a second step, we remeasure 
these differences after IAS 19R adoption (effect 2). To test H1, we calculate the difference 
between these pre- and post-IAS 19R differences (effect 3). This design controls for trends in 
pension asset allocations shared by both groups as well as observable and unobservable time-
invariant firm characteristics; it thus mitigates potential selection bias (Lennox, Francis, & 
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 In section 4.2, we discuss results for an alternative measure of pension plan exposure. 
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Wang, 2012). In addition, we use control variables to capture the effects of any observable 
time-variant firm characteristics that differ across the treatment and control groups.  
Figure 1 also illustrates the pre- and post-treatment periods around the transition to IAS 
19R. IAS 19R was issued by the IASB on June 16, 2011, obtained EU endorsement in June 
2012, and became effective for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2013. Important-
ly, the preceding 2010 exposure draft (IFRS Foundation 2010) was already very much in line 
with the final IAS 19R, in that it proposed the OCI method as the only permitted approach to 
accounting for actuarial gains and losses. As affected firms required time to analyze the new 
requirements and evaluate their consequences, we assume any IAS 19R-induced change in 
pension asset allocations to start becoming visible in 2012. This assumption is consistent with 
prior literature using difference-in-differences research designs to examine the effect of 
changes in regulations and laws (e.g., Agrawal, 2013). 
We structure our analysis over a four-year window centered on IAS 19R adoption. Spe-
cifically, we treat fiscal years 2010 and 2011 (2012 and 2013) as the pre-treatment (post-
treatment) period. This choice of window length in the post-treatment period reflects a trade-
off between allowing sufficient time for firms to adjust their pension asset allocations and the 
risk of a longer window capturing confounding factors that might explain deviating levels of 
%EQ and %BONDS across the two groups (Roberts & Whited, 2013).18 To apply the differ-
ence-in-differences design, we extend equation (1) by the variables TREAT and Post. TREAT 
is the treatment assignment variable that equals 1 if a firm has applied the corridor method 
before the treatment, and 0 otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 for post-
treatment periods, and 0 otherwise. To compare changes in the pension asset allocation across 
the treatment and control firms before and after the treatment, we introduce the interaction 
term Post × TREAT. We test H1 using the following regression:  
 
ASSET_ALLOCit = β0  + β1TREATit + β2Postit + β3Post x TREATit  
+ ∑ β	 Controlsit + εit       (2) 
  
 
In equation (2), Controls captures the control variables included in equation (1), TREAT 
captures pre-treatment differences across the treatment and control groups, and Post captures 
the treatment effect on the control group. The main coefficient of interest, β3 on Post × 
TREAT, captures the incremental treatment effect on ASSET_ALLOC (i.e., %EQ and 
%BONDS, respectively) in the treatment group relative to the control group (i.e., the differ-
                                                 
18
  In section 4.4.1 we discuss robustness tests using alternative time windows. 
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ence-in-differences). If treatment firms reduce (increase) their percentage of equities (bonds) 
more strongly than control firms (H1), we predict β3 to be negative (positive). 
H2 predicts that treatment firms’ pension plan characteristics affect the ‘IAS 19R effect’ 
on %EQ and %BONDS. To empirically test this prediction, we extend equation (2) by adding 
interactions between two different proxies for pension plan characteristics (PP_CHAR) and 
Post × TREAT, yielding the following regression: 
ASSET_ALLOCit = γ0  + γ1TREATit + γ2TREAT x PP_CHARit + γ3Postit  
+ γ4Post x PP_CHARit + γ5 Post x TREATit  
+ γ6Post x TREATit x PP_CHARit  
+ ∑ γ	 Controlsit + εit     (3)
  
 
PP_CHAR reflects either (1) Exp, the magnitude of the firm’s pension plan, measured 
as the ratio of pension assets to the book value of equity, or (2) Fund, a measure of a firm’s 
pension plan funded status.19 We interact PP_CHAR with TREAT, Post and Post × TREAT, 
respectively, to test whether the ‘IAS 19R effect’ (i.e., treatment firms’ relatively larger 
change in the pension asset allocation compared to control firms) is more pronounced for 
firms with larger or more strongly underfunded pension plans. 
In equation (3), Post × TREAT × PP_CHAR is the incremental pre- to post-treatment 
change in ASSET_ALLOC for treatment firms with high values of PP_CHAR, relative to those 
with low values. In line with the unsigned expression of H2, we predict no direction for the 
coefficients on these interactions, γ6. All models are estimated using pooled OLS regressions 
with standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
3.1.3 Addressing Self-Selection Bias 
Estimating causal effects of accounting standards poses the challenge that control samples 
often are either unavailable or non-randomly assigned, where the latter circumstance gives 
rise to the potential presence of correlated omitted variables. The German setting does provide 
the advantage of a set of control firms. However, these self-select into the control group by 
voluntarily adopting the OCI method – using an accounting choice offered under the original 
IAS 19 and eliminated by IAS 19R. In contrast, treatment firms switch to the OCI method 
only when forced to do so as IAS 19R becomes mandatory. To the degree that factors driving 
this accounting choice are correlated with firms’ pension asset allocations (%EQ and 
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 Both measures capture (i) the sensitivity of firms’ equity book values to pension-induced volatility and, simulta-
neously, (ii) the degree to which firms can mitigate that volatility by adjusting pension asset allocations.  
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%BONDS), coefficients on the independent variables could suffer from correlated omitted 
variable bias (Roberts & Whited, 2013), distorting inferences from the main test. 
As our difference-in-differences design does not fully rule out these concerns, we con-
struct the control sample through propensity-score matching based on firm characteristics that 
we expect to explain the choice between the corridor and the OCI methods. The matching 
procedure is intended to strengthen the key assumption of covariate balance across treatment 
and control firms, which mitigates the potential impact of correlated omitted variables (e.g., 
Rosenbaum, 2010). Collectively, this matching procedure and the difference-in-difference 
research design help us mitigate endogenous self-selection concerns, with the sole possible 
exception of unobserved time-variant firm characteristics that deviate across groups.20 While 
we cannot rule out this possibility, we have no reason to suspect such factors in our setting. 
We derive inputs for calculating the propensity scores by considering determinants of 
the choice of TREAT. Consistent with prior work (e.g., Glaum et al., 2018; Faßhauer et al., 
2011; Morais, 2010), we model firms’ choice of TREAT as a function of variables broadly 
capturing (1) the materiality of the pension plan; (2) expected exposure to pension-induced 
equity volatility; and (3) a firm’s commitment to transparency and industry best practice. This 
leads to the following probit regression, which predicts firms’ pre-IAS 19R choice of the cor-
ridor versus OCI methods (i.e., TREAT): 
Prob(TREAT=1) = δ0  + δ1Levit + δ2FFit + δ3Sizeit + δ4SDCFit + δ5Fundit  
+ δ6Horizonit + δ7Expit + ∑ δ Indit + εit   (4) 
 
As above, the indicator variable TREAT captures observations representing treatment 
firms that choose to apply the corridor method in the pre-IAS 19R adoption period (recall that 
only these firms are affected by mandatory IAS 19R adoption). Accordingly, TREAT assumes 
a value of 0 for control firm observations (i.e., representing firms that already applied the OCI 
method prescribed under IAS 19R before it was mandated).  
The corridor method mitigates pension-induced volatility in income statement and bal-
ance sheet amounts. Accordingly, equation (4) mainly includes explanatory variables from 
equation (1). We expect exposure to material pension plans (Exp) to affect the choice, as the 
corridor method mitigates pension-induced equity volatility, which increases in exposure. 
Similarly, a firm is more sensitive to pension-induced equity volatility, making the choice of 
the corridor method more likely, if it has higher leverage (Lev), lower free float (FF), higher 
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 Specifically, for results to be explained by an omitted variable, that variable would have to vary contemporane-
ously with IAS 19R adoption, and affect treatment and control firms differently. 
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risk (SDCF and Size), a longer investment horizon (Horizon), and a lower funding ratio 
(Fund). Finally, we capture a firm’s industry best practice by adding industry indicators.21 We 
estimate equation (4) using data for 2011, i.e., one year before the treatment date, across all 
firms listed in the Prime Standard as of January 1, 2014, and which have available data ac-
cording to the sample selection process outlined in section 3.2. This allows us to use pre-
treatment characteristics when matching treatment and control firms. We use one-to-one (i.e., 
single nearest neighbor) matching without replacement.22 
3.2 Sample and Data 
Table 1 illustrates the sample selection process. Sample firms are listed in Deutsche Börse 
Group’s Prime Standard segment as of December 12, 2014.23 We eliminate firms that do not 
sponsor externally funded defined benefit pension plans. We also drop firms that recognize 
actuarial gains and losses immediately in profit or loss (i.e., method 3 in section 2.1), as these 
firms should not expect IAS 19R to increase their equity volatility. Moreover, we exclude 
firms that invest pension assets solely in insurance contracts, as firm management cannot af-
fect the investment strategy for these assets (violating assumption 3 in section 2.3.1). Finally, 
we eliminate firms with insufficient information on the pension asset allocation. We are left 
with 90 unique firms in the main analyses: 41 potential treatment firms using the corridor 
method, and 49 potential control firms using the OCI method.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The sample period spans four fiscal years, 2010 to 2013.24 Our research design employs 
a balanced panel of treatment and control firms to enhance pre- and post-treatment compara-
                                                 
21
  Data constraints preclude us from including cumulative unrecognized actuarial gains and losses, another likely 
factor of influence. This is due to cumulative actuarial gains and losses not arising under the OCI method. How-
ever, our interview suggests that cumulative actuarial gains and losses were an important determinant of the 
choice of corridor versus OCI method only for early adopters switching to the OCI method in or shortly after 
2005. Further, comprehensive evidence in Glaum et al. (2018) documents that cumulative actuarial gains/losses 
explain firms’ OCI adoption decisions in 2005 – but not between 2006 and 2013. We thus believe that omitting 
cumulative actuarial gains/losses from a selection model estimated in 2011 will not result in severe omitted vari-
ables problems. 
22
  We also carry out robustness tests using caliper matching in section 4.4.3. 
23
 The Prime Standard segment comprises 340 listings representing 319 unique firms. (Several firms have both 
common stock and preferred stock outstanding; these count as separate listings.) We select this particular market 
segment, as it imposes transparency standards that go beyond EU minimum requirements. Besides reporting 
under IFRS, these firms published quarterly reports in German and English during our analysis period. However, 
as firms usually do not disclose the pension asset allocation in their interim reports, observations are restricted to 
one per year. Furthermore, firms listed outside of this segment often lack significant pension plans and typically 
do not provide sufficient information on pension asset allocations. 
24
 In robustness tests discussed in section 4.4.1, we vary the event window between 2010-2014 and 2009-2013. 
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bility by eliminating effects of time-invariant factors. Therefore, we require firms to have ob-
servations and test variables in all of the four analysis periods. This procedure yields 37 
treatment firms and 45 control firms. Observing these firms over a four-year period results in 
328 firm-year observations. We subsequently match treatment and control firms using the 
approach discussed in section 3.1.3, yielding a final sample of 216 firm-year observations 
(108 for treatment firms and 108 for control firms) used in the main analysis. 
We obtain financial statement data and pension asset allocation information from 
Worldscope, ascertaining the quality of the latter by manually verifying Worldscope data with 
footnote disclosures in firms’ annual reports accessed through Perfect Information database.25 
Finally, to identify treatment and control firms, we also hand-collect the method of recogniz-
ing actuarial gains and losses (refer to section 2.1). Finally, we conduct semi-structured inter-
views with Chief Accounting Officers of several sample firms during the first quarter of 2017; 
Online Appendix 2 provides related summary information. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 provides comparisons for the variables used in the main tests. Regarding 
the allocation of pension assets, treatment firms on average reduce amounts allocated to equi-
ties (%EQ) from 27.3% to 23.6% (a 14% reduction) between the pre- and post-treatment peri-
ods. In contrast, control firms’ %EQ values remain relatively more stable, diminishing from 
30.0% to 27.9% (a 7% reduction). Results for %BONDS are somewhat surprising, showing 
shrinking proportions allocated to bonds amidst falling interest rates. However, consistent 
with H1, treatment firms’ bond percentage falls by less (48.3% down to 46.5%, or 4%) than 
that of control firms (47.7% down to 42.9%, or 10%). The significance tests reported in Table 
2 suggest that there are no significant differences in the covariates of interest after matching.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2 illustrates these differences-in-differences, indicating that %EQ and %BONDS 
values for the treatment and control groups exhibit a parallel trend in the pre-treatment period, 
distinctly drifting apart in the post-treatment period. Difference-in-differences research de-
                                                 
25
 Note that, during the analysis period, mandated disclosure requirements on the composition of plan assets were 
limited to a disaggregation of the percentages or amounts of “equity instruments, debt instruments, property, and 
all other assets” (IAS 19.120A (j)) and “amounts included in the fair value of plan assets for … the entity’s own 
financial instruments; and … property occupied by, or other assets used by, the entity” (IAS 19.120A (k)). See 
Online Appendix 4 for examples of the various degrees of granularity in pension asset disclosures. 
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signs assume that the average change in the dependent variable would have been the same for 
the treatment and control groups absent the treatment (Roberts & Whited, 2013). This paral-
lel-trends assumption is more plausible if the dependent variable exhibits a similar trend for 
both groups during the pre-treatment period. Accordingly, we take Figure 2 as initial evidence 
supporting the parallel-trends assumption.26  
Two other notable insights emerge from Panel A of Table 2: First, treatment and control 
firms are relatively comparable in both the pre- and post-treatment periods, across all varia-
bles.27 Second, whereas most variables do not change significantly across the pre- and post-
treatment periods, firms’ exposure (Exp) increases by roughly three to five percentage points 
for the treatment and control group. Clearly, declining discount rates contribute to increased 
defined benefit obligations and low plan asset yields, increasing firms’ exposures. However, 
constant funding levels indicate that the increasing exposure is caused by relative changes in 
the book value of equity, which lead to higher exposures for control firms.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents correlations for the main variables of interest. Pearson 
(Spearman) correlations are shown above (below) the diagonal. All Spearman correlations 
between %EQ and the control variables (except for Lev) exhibit the expected signs; they are 
significant for FF, Fund, and Horizon. All Spearman correlations between %BONDS and the 
control variables (except for Size) exhibit the expected signs and are significant for Lev, FF, 
Size, Fund, Horizon and Exp. As expected, all asset allocation variables (%EQ, %BONDS, 
%OTHER, and %PROPERTY) are negatively correlated with each other, as they tend to be 
substitutes. Correlations among control variables are sufficiently low not to pose multicolline-
arity concerns, with variance inflation factors below 2.0 in the main tests. 
4.2 Main Results 
Panel A of Table 3 presents univariate tests of differences in %EQ and %BONDS between the 
treatment and control groups as well as over time. Treatment firms exhibit a decline in %EQ 
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 To formally test this assumption, we estimate a model where %EQ is the dependent variable, and the independ-
ent variables are those in equation (1). We include year dummies for the pre-treatment period (i.e., 2010) and the 
post-treatment periods (i.e., 2012 and 2013), and omit the dummy (i.e., 2011) for the year before the actual 
treatment date (i.e., 2012). In addition, we interact these year dummies with TREAT. Untabulated results rein-
force the validity of the parallel-trends assumption, as the coefficient on the interaction term TREAT x 2010 is 
statistically insignificant. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
27
  Panel A of Table 2 is based on the matched sample. Note that matching eliminated previous significant covariate 
differences between the treatment and control firms. As Table OA.1 in the Online Appendix shows significant 
pre-matching differences between the treatment and control firms (particularly in the pre-treatment period), pro-
pensity-score matching achieves its main objective of covariate balance between the treatment and control ob-
servations.  
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by -3.73; this difference is not significant (p-value = 0.235). Control firms’ %EQ declines by 
2.19; again, this difference is not significant (p-value = 0.546). The difference-in-differences 
of interest, -1.54, is significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.10). Similarly, whereas treatment 
and control firms’ changes in %BONDS are not statistically significant, the difference-in-
differences (3.03) is significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.020). These findings provide ini-
tial support for H1, which predicts that treatment firms decrease (increase) %EQ (%BONDS) 
relative to control firms after the mandatory adoption of IAS 19R. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Panel B of Table 3 reports multivariate results. Whereas columns (1) and (2) present 
baseline results for equation (1), columns (3) and (4) introduce the experimental variables 
Post, TREAT, and Post x TREAT, and present the results of the main test of H1.28 Results for 
the base model in column (1) show that %EQ is significantly associated as predicted with 
ownership structure (FF; coefficient = 0.14; z-statistic = 2.13) and the funding levels of pen-
sion plans (Fund; coefficient = -0.30; z-statistic = -2.80). The adjusted R2 of 31.5% is above 
findings in prior literature (e.g., Rauh, 2009; Anantharaman & Chuk, 2017). Turning to the 
results for %BONDS, column (2) displays the expected negative association with ownership 
structure (FF; coefficient = -0.26; z-statistic = -2.79), and an adjusted R2 of 29.0%.  
Column (3) presents the effect of the elimination of the corridor method on the percent-
age of equity securities in firms’ pension plan assets (H1). The main variable of interest – 
highlighted in bold – is Post × TREAT, which captures the change in %EQ after the introduc-
tion of IAS 19R that is unique to treatment firms (i.e., the difference-in-differences across the 
treatment and control firms). The coefficient on Post × TREAT is significant and negative, 
suggesting that, conditioning on the control variables, treatment firms on average reduce the 
percentage of equity investments by 2.46 percentage points (z-statistic = -3.35) more than 
control firms after IAS 19R adoption. This effect is economically significant given the pre-
treatment level of 27.3%,29 and supports H1. Turning to %BONDS, column (4) shows a coef-
ficient on Post × TREAT that is statistically significant and positive as expected (coefficient = 
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  Table 3 reports difference-in-differences results based on the matched sample. Online Appendix Table OA.2 
provides the results for the probit model used to match treatment and control firms. These results are robust to 
including %EQ (contemporaneous and lagged) in the probit model as an additional explanatory variable 
(untabulated). We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. Difference-in-differences results without matching 
(untabulated) lead to the same inferences as those reported in Table 3. However, note that covariate balance is 
limited in the unmatched sample. 
29
 The pre-treatment difference between treatment and control firms is captured by TREAT, which is negative but 
not significantly different from zero (coefficient = -1.36; z-statistic = -0.43). 
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4.61; z-statistic = 2.43); it is also economically significant relative to the pre-treatment level 
of 48.3%. Overall, results for both %EQ and %BONDS are consistent with treatment firms 
adjusting their pension asset allocations more strongly than control firms upon IAS 19R adop-
tion. This is consistent with the ‘IAS 19R effect’ of H1, which predicts that treatment firms 
attempt to counteract the increase in equity volatility expected under IAS 19R. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports results for equation (3), testing H2. Recall H2 predicts that 
pension plan magnitude (Exp) and funding (Fund) moderate the IAS 19R effect on %EQ and 
%BONDS. Accordingly, columns (1) and (3) present results for %EQ, whereas columns (2) 
and (4) focus on %BONDS. The main coefficient of interest in all columns – highlighted in 
bold – is that on the three-way interaction Post × TREAT × PP_CHAR (where PP_CHAR is 
either Exp or Fund), which captures incremental changes in %EQ or %BONDS after IAS 19R 
adoption unique to treatment firms with higher levels of Exp (i.e., relatively larger pension 
plans) or Fund (i.e., relatively better funded pension plans), respectively. 
Similar to the results in Table 3 Panel B, in column (1), the coefficient on 
Post × TREAT is negative and highly significant (coefficient = -6.70; z-statistic = -5.69). The 
coefficient on Post × TREAT × Exp is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.16; 
z-statistic = 4.36), indicating that exposure to larger pension plans attenuates treatment firms’ 
tendency to shift pension assets out of equities. Column (2) displays results consistent with 
this insight. The significantly negative coefficient on Post × TREAT × Exp with %BONDS as 
the dependent variable (coefficient = -0.17; z-statistic = -3.24) suggests that exposure to larger 
pension plans also dampens treatment firms’ proclivity to increase their bond investments 
relative to control firms upon IAS 19R adoption.30 Overall, whereas these attenuation effects 
may not appear economically massive, they reflect the change in the dependent variable asso-
ciated with a one-percentage-point change in the independent variable. Results are similar 
when we consider Fund as a pension plan characteristic, as evidenced by a highly significant 
positive (negative) coefficient on Post × TREAT × Fund for %EQ (%BONDS) as the depend-
ent variable (%EQ: coefficient = 0.08; z-statistic = 3.49; %BONDS: coefficient = -0.14; 
z-statistic = -2.26).31 The results on FUND is negatively significant whereas other control 
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 These results also hold when we calculate Exp as defined benefit obligation (rather than by pension assets, as in 
the main analyses) divided by the book value of equity, to capture the exposure of firms’ book value of equity to 
the size of pension plans for firms with relatively low pension assets but – at the same time – relatively high 
pension obligations. Untabulated results are consistent with the findings reported in the main analysis.  
31
 In addition to the Table 3 analyses, we implement the test of H2 by estimating equation (3) after splitting the 
sample based on the median value of PP_CHAR, which is either Exp or Fund. Results reported in Table OA.3 in 
the Online Appendix are consistent with those reported in Table 3. Specifically, we find significantly negative 
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variables are not significant, consistent with the results reported by Anantharaman and Chuk 
(2017).3233 
Taken together, the main tests support the prediction that firms adjust their pension as-
set allocations to mitigate pension-induced equity volatility when an accounting change (i.e., 
the mandatory adoption of IAS 19R) eliminates a previously available smoothing device (H1). 
We obtain this result using a difference-in-differences research design, which benchmarks 
treatment firms’ average response to trends exhibited by a group of control firms unaffected 
by that accounting change. We also find evidence for H2, under which we expect that pension 
plan characteristics – specifically magnitude (Exp) and funding status (Fund) – moderate the 
IAS 19R effect on the pension asset allocation. Interpreted in the light of our evidence from 
interviews and firms’ public statements, results indicate that IAS 19R prompts firms to take 
action to mitigate IAS 19R-induced equity volatility. One instrument of choice for achieving 
this aim is to rebalance the pension asset allocation away from riskier assets. Firms with rela-
tively larger and better funded pension plans exhibit this behavior to a lesser degree – pre-
sumably because they supplement, or even prioritize, other de-risking strategies (which are 
more difficult for us to observe), such as derivative hedging34, settlements or curtailments, 
over the reallocation of pension assets out of equities and into bonds.35 
4.3 Alternative Analyses: Disentangling the “IAS 19R Effect” 
This section complements the main analysis of section 4.2 by exploring an alternative channel 
through which adoption of IAS 19R could affect treatment firms’ pension asset allocations. 
As explained in section 2.1, IAS 19R not only eliminates the corridor method in favor of the 
OCI method (the ‘OCI effect’), but it also changes the calculation of net periodic pension cost 
                                                                                                                                                        
(positive) coefficients on POST x TREAT for firms with below-median PP_CHAR where the dependent variable 
is %EQ (%BONDS). In contrast, coefficients on POST x TREAT are insignificant for firms with above-median 
PP_CHAR (except for PP_CHAR = Fund in the %BONDS model).  
32
  These results suggest that treatment and control firms are closely balanced along these variables. 
33
  We repeated the analysis reported in Table 3 after including year fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed effects, 
and the results are qualitatively similar. 
34
 Due to lack of granularity in firms’ pension asset disclosures, we are unable to test explicitly whether treatment 
firms adjust their derivatives-based pension de-risking activities around the adoption of IAS 19R. Inspection of 
pension footnotes indicates that only a small portion of our sample discloses the proportion of pension assets 
representing derivatives. Even for those firms, the specific types of derivatives, their attributes, and whether they 
are intended for pension de-risking, are ultimately opaque. 
35
 Overall, these findings are robust to including SHIFT, an indicator variable equal to one if firm i terminates or 
freezes existing defined benefit pension plans, or transfers risk to insurance companies, in year t, and zero oth-
erwise, as an additional control variable, following Amir et al. (2010). However, the three-way interactions are 
insignificant when PP_CHAR is Fund (refer to section 4.4.4). The purpose of including SHIFT is to control for 
firms altering or closing their defined benefit pension plans as an alternative means of mitigating the increase in 
pension-induced equity volatility brought about by IAS 19R.  
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by requiring that the expected return on plan assets be based on the discount rate. This ‘ERR 
effect’ could trigger pension asset rebalancing, e.g., through managers losing their incentive 
to invest in risky pension assets as a justification for inflated ERRs and higher earnings (e.g., 
Bergstresser et al., 2006; Anantharaman & Chuk, 2017).  
However, such asset allocation shifting should only arise where it is of sufficient magni-
tude to matter, i.e., (1) where plan assets tend to be larger relative to DBOs (generating larger 
returns, ceteris paribus), and (2) where expected rate of return assumptions tend to deviate 
more from discount rate assumptions. Regarding (1), German firms traditionally employ un-
funded defined benefit plans (i.e., plans with no plan assets) as well as funded defined benefit 
plans. Consequently, the pre-treatment median funded status (i.e., fair value of plan assets as a 
percentage of the DBO) of the German treatment group is 62.8% (Table OA.5 in the Online 
Appendix), compared to 80.2% for Anantharaman and Chuk’s (their Panel A of Table 2) Ca-
nadian treatment group. Regarding (2), we have compared pre-treatment ERRs and discount 
rates for the German and Canadian treatment groups. (Recall that separate ERRs are no longer 
available under IAS 19R post-treatment.) Whereas German treatment firms’ median ERR is 
5.21%, Anantharaman and Chuk’s (their Panel A of Table 2) Canadian treatment firms use a 
median ERR of 6.27%; at the same time, median discount rates are nearly equal (4.69 versus 
4.50%). The higher median deviations between ERRs and discount rates for Canadian firms 
suggest that the expected ERR-induced earnings impact of IAS 19R is larger for Canadian 
firms. We view these structural differences (1) and (2) between Canadian and German pen-
sion plans as indicators that any ERR effect in Germany will differ from that documented by 
Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) for Canada. 
To isolate the ERR effect, we use treatment firms that switch from the OCI method un-
der IAS 19 (asset returns based on expected rate assumption) to that under IAS 19R (asset 
returns based on discount rate). This treatment group is provided by German IAS 19R 
adopters that had been voluntarily applying the OCI method under the original IAS 19 and 
now adopt IAS 19R (i.e., the previous control group in the main tests; see section 4.2). The 
control group here consists of U.S. firms reporting under SFAS 158; these firms apply a sta-
ble OCI method (with asset returns calculated using firms’ expected rate of return assump-
tions) throughout the analysis period. This test effectively isolates the ERR effect by holding 
firms’ application of the OCI method constant while varying the expected rate of return meth-
od. We select U.S. control observations by downloading data for U.S. firms sponsoring de-
fined benefit pension plans between 2010 and 2013, i.e., the same time period used in the 
main analysis reported in Table 3. We then apply a propensity score matching procedure that 
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mirrors the one used for the main analyses in section 4.2; it yields 164 treatment observations 
and an equal number of matched control observations.36 Summary statistics indicate covariate 
balance in the pre-treatment period, the only exception being U.S. firms’ higher percentage of 
free float (FF). German and U.S. firms further differ in their pension asset allocations, with 
U.S. firms having significantly higher (lower) %EQ (%BONDS).37,38  
Multivariate regression results are reported in Table 4, which mirrors the layout of Ta-
ble 3 Panel C. Regarding the pension asset allocation to equities (%EQ), column (1) indicates 
no significant effect of IAS 19R on treatment firms when the partitioning variable captures 
relative pension plan size (i.e., PP_CHAR = Exp). However, when PP_CHAR = Fund in Col-
umn (3), treatment firms with lower funded status significantly increase their %EQ relative to 
control firms after mandatory IAS 19R adoption (coefficient on Post × TREAT = 7.00; 
z-statistic = 2.75). That effect is slightly attenuated for firms with high Fund, evidenced by a 
significantly negative coefficient on Post × TREAT × Fund (-0.10; z-statistic = -2.90).  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Turning to the pension asset allocation to bonds (%BONDS), column (2) shows that 
treatment firms with small pension plans (i.e., low Exp) strongly and significantly decrease 
their %BONDS relative to control firms after mandatory IAS 19R adoption (coefficient on 
Post × TREAT = -11.01; z-statistic = -7.01). That effect also is slightly attenuated for firms 
with high Exp (significantly positive coefficient on Post × TREAT × Exp of 0.12; 
z-statistic = 3.32). In column (4), we find a similar relation for Fund as the conditioning pen-
sion plan characteristic, with the coefficient on Post × TREAT negative and highly significant 
(-12.08; z-statistic = -5.59); however, no significant incremental effect of high funding is ob-
served (insignificant coefficient on Post × TREAT × Fund).39 
Recall these alternative analyses repeat the main test for a setting in which only the cal-
culation of pension expense changes (the ‘ERR effect’), with no corresponding change to the 
accounting for actuarial gains and losses (the ‘OCI effect’). In this setting, which isolates the 
                                                 
36
 For sample selection details, refer to Table OA.4 in the Online Appendix. 
37
 Full summary statistics are reported in Table OA.5 in the Online Appendix. 
38
   Untabulated results for H1 suggest that Post × TREAT is insignificant in the %EQ model, whereas it is negatively 
significant in the %BONDS model. 
39
  We repeated the analysis reported in Table 4 after including year fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed effects, 
and the results are qualitatively similar, with the exception of the coefficient on Post × TREAT, which is positive 
and marginally significant in the %EQ model in column (1) when including industry-by-year fixed effects. 
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ERR effect,40 any significant rebalancing in pension asset allocations should not be due to the 
OCI effect. Indeed, the results described in this section show a pattern of pension asset re-
balancing distinct from that found in the main tests. Specifically, the ERR effect documented 
here is consistent with treatment firms strongly shifting out of bonds relative to control firms. 
This contradicts H1 and our main finding reported in section 4.2; it also contrasts with what 
Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) finds for Canadian firms. It is not obvious why these differ-
ences emerge. Our discussion and descriptive evidence presented earlier in this section indi-
cate that German and Canadian pension plans differ in terms of pre-IAS 19R funded status 
and ERR assumptions. In addition, in contrast to the study by Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) 
the spread between the ERR and the discount rate is much smaller German firms, which may 
partly explain the divergent findings. Additional factors underlying diverging German versus 
Canadian ERR effects could include different sample compositions and management incen-
tives.41  
4.4 Robustness Tests 
4.4.1 Alternative Measurement Windows 
The main analyses use four fiscal years, two in the pre- (2010 and 2011) and two in post-
treatment period (2012 and 2013), with the beginning of 2012 as the treatment date. We ex-
pect this window to be sufficiently long for firms to adjust their pension asset allocations, and 
simultaneously short enough to minimize the risk of capturing confounding factors that affect 
the treatment and control groups differently. In this section, we vary the measurement win-
dow in two ways to assess the robustness of our identification strategy. First, to account for 
the possibility that firms require more time to reallocate their pension assets, we increase the 
number of post-treatment periods to three, by including 2014. Second, we extend the pre-
treatment period by one year, yielding the five-year window 2009-2013.  
Panel A of Table OA.6 presents the results for the 2010-2014 window, whereas Panel B 
presents the results for the 2009-2013 window. In both panels, columns (1) and (2) report re-
                                                 
40
 Note this test is largely comparable with the main test in Anantharaman and Chuk (2017) – with one exception: 
Whereas our treatment group in this test consists solely of OCI method firms, Anantharaman and Chuk’s (2017) 
main test includes corridor firms in the treatment group, effectively mixing the ERR and OCI effects. Anantha-
raman and Chuk (2017) include an indicator variable, e.g., CORRIDOR, to control for the alternative options for 
recognizing actuarial gains or losses under IAS 19; they note that the CORRIDOR indicator variable is insignifi-
cant, ‘suggesting that any balance sheet effects for firms using the corridor method for balance sheet recognition 
prior to IAS 19R are not substantial’ (p. 28). 
41
 Furthermore, Anantharaman and Chuk’s (2017) research design choices vary to some extent from ours, includ-
ing in the choice of matching algorithm, measurement windows and control variables.  
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sults for %EQ and %BONDS where PP_CHAR = Exp, and columns (3) and (4) repeat the 
analyses for PP_CHAR = Fund. When %EQ is the dependent variable, results are directional-
ly consistent with, albeit somewhat weaker than, the main tests reported in section 4.2. Specif-
ically, no significant effects obtain when Fund is the pension plan characteristic examined. 
These weaker results are to some extent expected, as lengthening the measurement windows 
around the treatment date decreases test power. When %BONDS is the dependent variable, 
results are consistent with the main tests, with coefficients on Post × TREAT positive and 
significant across all specifications. Also, coefficients on Post × TREAT × Exp are negatively 
significant, again consistent with the results reported in the main analysis, with the exception 
of results reported in column (2) of Panel B. Overall, these results suggest that firms are on 
average able to adjust their pension asset allocations within two years after the publication of 
IAS 19R. 
4.4.2 Alternative Treatment Dates and Placebo Tests 
As discussed in section 3.1.2, we expect the treatment date (beginning of 2012) to capture the 
point in time at which treatment firms start adjusting to the requirements of IAS 19R. To ex-
amine alternative treatment dates, we conduct the following two sets of additional tests. First, 
we shift the treatment date to the beginning of 2013 (IAS 19R’s official effective date; see 
Figure 1), yielding a four-year window (2011-2014). We do this because firms’ pension asset 
rebalancing might be a process still ongoing after 2013. Second, as a placebo test, we repeat 
the main tests for periods during which no treatment effect is expected. Finding no signifi-
cantly negative coefficient on Post x TREAT in the period before mandatory IAS 19R adop-
tion decreases the likelihood that the difference-in-differences is a chance finding, increasing 
our confidence in the parallel-trends assumption underlying the main tests. We therefore re-
estimate the main analysis for the period 2007-2010 and falsely assume a treatment three 
years earlier, in 2009. Failing to find significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups would support the parallel trend assumption.42 
Results for 2013 as the treatment date are reported in Panel C of Table OA.6. Columns 
(1) and (3) report the results for %EQ and columns (2) and (4) report the results for 
%BONDS. The coefficient on Post x TREAT is negatively significant in column (1), when 
                                                 
42
 In untabulated analyses, we conduct another robustness test, where, we define 2009-2010 as the pre-treatment 
period and 2013-2014 as the post-treatment period. Overall, the results are very similar (with coefficients slightly 
larger) to those reported in the main analysis when PP_CHAR = Exp. However, the coefficients of interest are 
only significant for PP_CHAR = Fund in the %BONDS specification. 
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Exp is the PP_CHAR examined; the Post × TREAT × Exp coefficient is positively significant. 
These results are consistent with those reported in the main analysis. However, the variables 
of interest are insignificant when Fund is the PP_CHAR in column (3). As expected and con-
sistent with the results reported in the main analysis, the coefficient on Post x TREAT is posi-
tive and significant when %BONDS is the dependent variable in columns (2) and (4). Howev-
er, Post × TREAT × Exp and Post × TREAT × Fund are statistically insignificant. 
Panel D of Table OA.6 reports the results when assuming a placebo treatment date in 
2009. Again, columns (1) and (2) report the results for %EQ and %BONDS when Exp is the 
PP_CHAR examined, while columns (3) and (4) report the results for %EQ and %BONDS 
when Fund is the PP_CHAR examined. The coefficients on Post × TREAT, 
Post × TREAT × PP_CHAR are insignificant when %EQ is the dependent variable and when 
PP_CHAR is Exp and Fund. This is expected, as there is no treatment that would cause %EQ 
to diverge between the treatment and control groups. Unexpectedly, the Post × TREAT coef-
ficient is positively significant when %BONDS is the dependent variable in column (2), and 
Post × TREAT × Exp is negatively significant. Overall, however, results of this falsification 
test support our inferences from the main analyses that the difference-in-differences in pen-
sion asset allocations observed in 2012 are likely caused by IAS 19R, rather than some alter-
native event occurring earlier. 
4.4.3 Alternative Matching Procedures 
In the main analysis, we used nearest-neighbor matching without replacement to match treat-
ment and control firms. As a robustness test, we apply caliper matching without replacement. 
In this context, we follow prior literature and set the caliper equal to 20% of the standard de-
viation of the estimated propensity score (Cochran & Rubin, 1973; D’Agostino, 1998). This 
matching procedure reduces the sample size to 144 firm-year observations.  
The results are reported in Table OA.7 in the Online Appendix. Columns (1) and (2) re-
port the results for %EQ and %BONDS when Exp is the PP_CHAR examined, while columns 
(3) and (4) report the results for %EQ and %BONDS when Fund is the PP_CHAR examined. 
When %EQ is the dependent variable, the Post x TREAT coefficient is negatively significant 
in columns (1) and (3) and the Post × TREAT × Exp coefficient is positively significant in 
column (1), consistent with the results reported in the main analysis. However, the 
Post × TREAT × Fund coefficient in column (3) is insignificant. When %BONDS is the de-
pendent variable Post × TREAT is positively significant and Post × TREAT × PP_CHAR is 
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negatively significant across all specifications. Overall, these results suggest that the main 
findings are robust to this alternative matching procedure. 
4.4.4 Additional Control Variables  
In this section, we test whether the main findings are robust to additional control variables. 
Regarding additional control variables, we include the square of the funding ratio (Fund2), the 
square of percentage of free float (FF2), market returns (Market Returns), the payout ratio 
(Payout Ratio) and a variable capturing terminations and freezes of defined benefit plans as 
well as transfers of risk to insurance companies (SHIFT). Fund2 captures a possible non-linear 
relation between Fund and %EQ. As described in section 3.1, this relation is suggested by 
theoretical research for firms with low levels of funding, as managers have incentive to in-
crease %EQ to benefit from the increase in risk (Harrison & Sharpe, 1983; Rauh, 2009). Simi-
larly, the square of FF controls for a non-linear relation between ownership structure and 
%EQ. Prior research by Faßhauer et al. (2011) finds that very low and very high ownership 
concentrations explain the choice between the corridor and OCI methods. However, we do 
not include these variables in the main analysis because of  potential multicollinearity is-
sues.43 Further, we include a proxy for stock market performance (Market Returns) as an ad-
ditional control variable. Positive (negative) market returns increase (decrease) the value of 
equity investments. If firms do not rebalance their portfolios, %EQ varies with market returns. 
Consistent with Anantharaman and Chuk (2017), we measure market returns by the returns to 
the S&P Global Broad Market Index for equities, which measures global stock market per-
formance. Over the sample period, Market Returns is positive for all years except 2011. Fol-
lowing Anantharaman and Chuk (2017), we include the dividend payout ratio, as firms which 
typically pay dividends have stronger incentives to minimize volatility in order to ensure that 
they will have sufficient cash flows to make dividend payments. Finally, we include SHIFT, 
following Amir et al. (2010). 
Table OA.8 in the Online Appendix presents results of including these additional con-
trol variables. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for %EQ and %BONDS when Exp is the 
PP_CHAR examined, while columns (3) and (4) report the results for %EQ and %BONDS 
when Fund is the PP_CHAR examined. The coefficient on Post × TREAT is significantly 
negative when %EQ is the dependent variable in column (1) and positive for %BONDS in 
                                                 
43
  Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between Fund and Fund2 are significant and above 0.96 and those 
between FF and FF2 are significant and above 0.99. 
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columns (2) and (4), consistent with the results reported in the main analysis. The 
Post × TREAT × Exp and Post × TREAT × Fund coefficients for %EQ and %BONDS are 
significantly positive and negative respectively in columns (1) and (2).44 Overall, the findings 
generally support results of the main analyses in Table 3. 
4.4.5 Subsample Analyses 
Finally, we analyze subsamples excluding firms with high proportions of ‘other (pension) 
assets’ to address concerns regarding the characteristics of the pension asset category of ‘other 
assets’ and in particular the opacity of this asset class. We find an increase in the median 
%OTHER from 15.2% in the pre-IAS 19R period to 18.1% in the post-IAS 19R period for the 
main sample. Föhrenbach, Glaum, and Keller (2015) raises the concern that the aggregation 
of ‘other assets’ into a residual category loses information needed to evaluate the risk charac-
teristics and volatility of these assets. For example, ‘other assets’ includes both insurance con-
tracts and shares in hedge funds, which we expect to have different risk properties. In fact, 
assuming that lower levels of pension assets invested into equities lead to lower levels of vol-
atility depends on the volatility characteristics of other asset classes. To address the impact of 
the inclusion of ‘other assets’ in the main analysis, we carry out a robustness test excluding 
observations for which the category ‘other assets’ is 25% or greater. 
The results are reported in Table OA.9 in the Online Appendix. Columns (1) and (2) re-
port the results for %EQ and %BONDS when Exp is the PP_CHAR examined, while columns 
(3) and (4) report the results for %EQ and %BONDS when Fund is the PP_CHAR examined. 
The coefficient on Post × TREAT is significantly negative (positive) for %EQ and %BONDS; 
the coefficient on Post × TREAT × Exp (Post × TREAT × Fund) is positive (negative) when 
%EQ (%BONDS) is the dependent variable, consistent with the results reported in the main 
analysis. Inferences are similar when we exclude observations for which the category ‘other 
assets’ is 20% or greater (untabulated). In particular, the coefficient on POST x TREAT is 
negative (positive) when the dependent variable is %EQ (%BONDS); however, the coefficient 
on POST × TREAT × PP_CHAR is statistically insignificant, possibly due to reduced sample 
size and hence lower test power. Overall, these results suggest that the findings of the main 
analysis are not driven by firms that invest pension assets in this opaque asset category; they 
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 However, the Post × TREAT and Post × TREAT × Fund coefficients are insignificant in column (3) where 
PP_CHAR is Fund. The Post × TREAT × Fund is also insignificant in column (4). Given the high correlation 
between Fund and Fund2, this regression specification suffers from multicollinearity.  
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indicate that there was no massive substitution effect in the asset allocation between equities 
and other assets.  
5 Conclusion 
This paper examines the ‘real’ effects of a change in accounting standards on a specific type 
of investment decision: firms’ allocation of pension assets into asset classes with different risk 
and return profiles. Extant literature identifies the elimination of the expected rate of return 
(Anantharaman & Chuk, 2017), the risk of recognizing an additional minimum pension liabil-
ity (Amir & Benartzi, 1999), and the introduction of IAS 19 (Amir et al., 2010) as examples 
of accounting standards affecting pension asset allocations. We advance this stream of re-
search by examining whether the elimination of the corridor method of recognizing actuarial 
pension gains and losses affects the allocation of firms’ pension assets. 
To examine this research question, we use the mandatory change from IAS 19 to 
IAS 19R. The latter requires immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses in other 
comprehensive income (OCI method), removing a previously available smoothing device. We 
apply a difference-in-differences research design that compares treatment firms affected by 
the accounting change to control firms that are unaffected. This test design allows us to ap-
proach identification of the causal effect of mandatory IAS 19R adoption on firms’ pension 
asset allocations to the extent feasible in an observational study.  
We predict and find that treatment firms shift their pension assets from equities into 
bonds relative to matched control firms, consistent with firms rebalancing their pension asset 
allocations to mitigate a potential increase in pension-induced equity volatility. Further, we 
find that this rebalancing is attenuated for firms with larger pension plans and higher funding 
levels. Results are robust to alternative control groups, varying measurement periods and al-
ternative model specifications.  
We further undertake to disentangle two distinct and potentially contradicting effects of 
IAS 19R on firms’ pension asset allocations: the OCI effect and the ERR effect. Whereas the 
main tests inevitably mix both effects, they suggest – consistent with predictions – that the 
OCI effect is strong and driven by firms’ concerns about IAS 19R-induced equity volatility. 
In contrast, the additional analysis using German OCI firms and a U.S. control sample yields 
results that are inconsistent with our predictions and concurrent evidence from the Canadian 
setting (Anantharaman & Chuk, 2017). Future research can exploit settings that allow clean 
isolation of the OCI effect. Such settings require holding the ERR method constant while var-
ying the OCI method. One such setting consists of corridor-method firms adopting the “old” 
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OCI method under IAS 19 in the pre-IAS 19R period. Control samples would be given by 
corridor-method or OCI-method firms staying with their respective methods throughout the 
analysis period. While we attempted such tests in our setting, data constraints (i.e., a small 
number of treatment firms) preclude them. 
Our results are subject to the following limitations. First, the single-country results may 
not generalize to other countries. Second, we do not explicitly test implications of Anantha-
raman and Lee (2014), which suggests manager-specific incentives as further determinant of 
pension asset allocations. However, to the extent that these incentives are time-invariant, our 
difference-in-differences research design controls for them. Third, propensity score matching 
requires close matches, thus reducing the sample and the power of the tests. Fourth, the 
matched-sample difference-in-differences design addresses omitted variable bias to the extent 
feasible in the present setting; however, lingering self-selection concerns cannot be entirely 
ruled out. Finally, a lack of detailed disclosure requirements inhibits our ability to discern the 
asset classes (except bonds) that firms shift into when reducing their exposure to equities. 
Specifically, a large and opaque category ‘other assets’ (which can contain low-risk assets 
such as cash as well as high-risk ones such as hedge fund shares) likely captures some of 
these movements (see Föhrenbach et al., 2015). Finer disaggregation would render plan asset 
disclosures more useful for many purposes, including risk assessment and academic research. 
This study complements prior literature on the determinants of pension asset alloca-
tions. In a broader context, we add to the literature on the ‘real’ effects of accounting by 
showing that managers alter their pension assets investment strategies in response to an ac-
counting change that increases expected pension-induced equity volatility. These insights are 
relevant to financial reporting standard setters, as they elucidate the behavioral consequences 
of accounting standards – in particular, of those that narrow firms’ set of accounting choices 
and of those that increase expected financial statement volatility. Finally, our findings suggest 
that accounting for corporate pension plans affects the allocation of pension assets and there-
by their riskiness. Such shifts may or may not be intended or desired by the standard setter. 
Future research could explore the consequences of these behavioral shifts for the firms’ 
stakeholders, and how these effects vary with the extent of home bias in firms’ asset alloca-
tion decisions. 
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Appendix A.  Variable definitions 
 
%EQit Percentage of equity investments, equal to pension assets allocated to equity 
securities of firm i for year t, divided by firm i’s total pension assets of year t, 
all measured at the end of fiscal year t (sources: hand-collection, Worldscope 
data item 18807). 
%BONDSit Percentage of bond investments, equal to pension assets allocated to fixed-
income securities of firm i for year t, divided by firm i’s total pension assets of 
year t, all measured at the end of fiscal year t (sources: hand-collection, 
Worldscope data item 18807). 
%OTHERit Percentage of other investments, equal to pension assets allocated to other 
assets of firm i for year t, divided by firm i’s total pension assets of year t, all 
measured at the end of fiscal year t (sources: hand-collection, Worldscope data 
item 18807). 
%PROPERTYit Percentage of property investments, equal to pension assets allocated to real 
estate property of firm i for year t, divided by firm i’s total pension assets of 
year t, all measured at the end of fiscal year t (sources: hand-collection, 
Worldscope data item 18807). 
TREATi Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a treatment firm, i.e., recognizes actu-
arial gains and losses under the corridor method in 2012, and 0 if firm i uses 
the OCI method in 2012 (source: hand-collection). 
Postit Indicator variable equal to 1 for post-treatment periods, beginning in 2012, and 
0 for pre-treatment periods. 
Levit Leverage ratio of firm i for year t, equal to total liabilities of firm i, divided by 
firm i’s total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t (source: 
Worldscope data items 03351, 02999). 
FFit Percentage of free float of firm i for year t, equal to the number of shares in 
free float of firm i, divided by firm i’s total number of shares multiplied by 
100, both measured at the end of fiscal year t (source: Worldscope data item 
noshff). 
Sizeit Natural logarithm of the market value of equity of firm i, measured at the end 
of fiscal year t (source: Worldscope data item 08001). 
SDCFit Standard deviation of operating cash flows of firm i for year t, equal to the 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of operating cash flows over the 
past 4 years of firm i, divided by firm i’s book value of equity, all measured at 
the end of fiscal year t (source: Worldscope data items 04860, 03501). 
Fundit Pension funding ratio of firm i for year t, equal to external pension assets of 
firm i, divided by firm i’s overall defined benefit obligations multiplied by 
100, both measured at the end of fiscal year t (sources: hand-collection, 
Worldscope data items 18807, 18809).  
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Horizonit Investment horizon of pension assets, equal to the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of defined benefit obligations of firm i, divided by firm i’s current service 
cost, both measured at the end of fiscal year t (source: Worldscope data items 
18809, 18811). 
Expit Exposure of firm i’s book value of equity to the size of a pension plan for year 
t, equal to pension assets of firm i, divided by firm i’s book value of equity 
multiplied by 100, both measured at the end of fiscal year t (source: 
Worldscope data items 18807, 03501). 
Indit Industry indicator variables (source: based on Worldscope data item 07021: 
SIC code). We specify the following industry indicators: (1) agriculture, for-
estry and fishing, (2) mining, (3) construction, (4) manufacturing, (5) transpor-
tation, communications, electric, gas, sanitary service, (6) wholesale trade, (7) 
retail trade, (8) finance, insurance and real estate, (9) services (10) public ad-
ministration, (11) nonclassifiable. 
Market Returnst Market returns for year t, measure by the 12 months returns of the S&P Global 
Broad Market Index for equities of year t (source: S&P website). 
Payout Ratioit Common and preferred stock dividends paid by firm i in year t, divided by net 
income (source: Capital IQ). 
Shiftit Indicator variable equal to one if firm i terminates or freezes existing defined 
benefit pension plans, or transfers risk to insurance companies, in year t, and 
zero otherwise (source: hand-collection). 
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Figure 1.   Difference-in-differences research design 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 illustrates the difference-in-differences research design used in our main tests to identify the effect of IAS 
19R on pension asset allocations. (Note that, whereas we observe two asset allocation characteristics, the percent-
age of equities, %EQ, and the percentage of bonds, %BONDS, the figure only depicts one of them: %EQ.) We 
observe %EQ and %BONDS for two groups of firms: a treatment group affected by mandatory IAS 19R adoption 
(solid line) and a control group not subject to this accounting change (dotted line). The Y axis of the graph depicts 
levels of %EQ, and the X axis represents a time line. Our research design measures differences in %EQ and 
%BONDS before (effect 1) and after (effect 2) the “treatment”: the transition to IAS 19R. This difference-in-
differences (effect 3) represents the causal treatment effect of IAS 19R on %EQ under the appropriate assumptions 
(refer to section 3.1). We use 2012 as the treatment date, as the introduction and details of IAS 19R were known to 
firms in mid-2011 (when it was published), although it was effective only for fiscal years beginning on 1 January 
2013 or after.  
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Figure 2.   Equity and bond investments of treatment and control firms over time 
 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the two asset allocation characteristics, the percentage of equities (%EQ) and the percentage of 
bonds (%BONDS), for the treatment group affected by mandatory IAS 19R adoption (solid lines) and a control 
group not subject to this accounting change (dotted lines), around the “treatment”: mandatory adoption of IAS 19R. 
Both %EQ and %BONDS exhibit relatively parallel trends in the years leading up to IAS 19R adoption, and drift 
apart subsequently. 
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Table 1.   Sample selection 
 
 Unique Firms 
Number of firms listed within the Prime Standard  319 
    segment of Deutsche Börse Group, active as  
    of December 12, 2014.  
Less firms  
    without defined benefit pension (DB) plans -102 
    without externally funded DB plans -45 
    that apply neither the corridor method 
    nor the OCI method prior to IAS 19R adoption -17 
    that fully fund pension plans with insurance contracts -56 
    that lack information on the pension asset allocation -9 
 90  
 
Corridor Method OCI Method 
(Treatment Firms) (Control Firms) 
41 49 
Less firms 
    that lack information to calculate test variables -1 0 
    that are not listed in each year of the sample period -3 -4 
Firm-year observations per period   37     45   
Times four analysis periods (2010-2013) x4 x4 
Firm-year observations over total analysis period 148 180 
Less observations dropped during matching process   
-40     -72   
Firm-year observations used in main analyses (Table 3) 108       108   
 
Table 1 presents the sample selection process. The initial sample consists of all firms listed within the Prime Standard 
segment of Deutsche Börse Group as of December 12, 2014. We exclude firms: (1) without defined benefit pension 
plans; (2) without externally funded defined benefit pension plans; (3) that recognize actuarial gains and losses in profit 
or loss; and (4) that fully fund pension plans with insurance contracts only. The remaining 90 firms are classified into the 
treatment and control groups according to their method of recognizing actuarial gains and losses. We exclude firms that 
lack sufficient data or observations, resulting in 37 unique treatment firms and 45 unique control firms. We analyze 
treatment and control firms over four periods, resulting in 328 firm-year observations; the final sample used in the main 
empirical analysis in Table 3 after matching treatment and control firms using propensity score matching includes 108 
firm-year observations for treatment and 108 firm-year observations for control firms. 
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Table 2.   Summary statistics for the matched sample 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
    
  
  Pre-Treatment Period (aggregated over 2010 and 2011) 
Variable       treatment observations   control observations 
N mean median sd mean median sd 
%EQ 108 27.3 26.4 17.1 30.0 28.0 18.1 
%BOND 108 48.3 47.0 19.2 47.7 47.7 24.2 
%OTHER 108 17.2 15.2 14.5 17.1 9.0 19.5 
%PROPERTY 108 7.2 4.2 7.9 5.1 2.0 * 9.0 
Lev 108 63.9 66.3 18.6 63.3 61.5 18.6 
FF 108 71.9 76.5 24.9 71.6 76.0 24.4 
Size 108 7.6 7.1 1.7 7.9 7.9 1.5 
SDCF 108 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Fund 108 55.3 63.1 24.9 49.0 53.2 27.9 
Horizon 108 3.9 3.8 1.0 3.8 3.8 0.6 
Exp   108   21.0 15.1 22.5   25.1 8.8   37.9 
    
  
  Post-Treatment Period (aggregated over 2012 and 2013) 
Variable       treatment observations   control observations 
N mean median sd mean median sd 
%EQ 108 23.6 23.1 15.4 27.9 25.6 19.4 
%BOND 108 46.5 45.7 21.7 42.9 44.4 24.4 
%OTHER 108 24.2 18.1 22.0 23.8 17.0 25.4 
%PROPERTY 108 5.6 2.7 7.2 5.3 1.7 10.1 
Lev 108 62.5 63.5 18.3 62.3 62.0 20.5 
FF 108 74.9 75.0 23.4 69.6 74.5 23.0 
Size 108 7.9 7.5 1.7 8.2 8.1 1.4 
SDCF 108 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Fund 108 52.9 59.8 25.1 49.1 52.1 26.0 
Horizon 108 3.9 3.9 1.1 3.8 3.9 0.6 
Exp   108   24.0 17.3 31.2   29.8 9.6   44.1 
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Panel B: Pearson and Spearman correlations 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main analyses of Table 3. Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest, split between the treatment group and the matched control 
group as well as the pre- and post-treatment periods.  
Panel B provides correlation coefficients between the variables used in the empirical analysis. The upper (lower) 
diagonal shows Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients. %EQ is the percentage of equity investments, 
%BONDS is the percentage of bond investments, %OTHER is the percentage of other investments and %PROP-
ERTY is the percentage of property investments. Lev is the leverage ratio defined as total liabilities divided by 
total assets, FF is percentage of free float and is equal to the number of shares in free float divided by the total 
number of shares multiplied by 100, Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, SDCF is the 
standard deviation of operating cash flows equal to the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of operating 
cash flows over the past 4 years divided by the book value of equity. Fund is the pension funding ratio defined as 
external pension assets divided defined benefit obligations and multiplied by 100. Horizon is the investment 
horizon of pension assets and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of defined benefit obligations divid-
ed by the current service cost. Exp captures the exposure of a firm’s book value of equity to the size of a pension 
plan and is defined as pension plan assets divided by the book value of equity multiplied by 100. All continuous 
variables have been winsorized at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively (using a two-tailed test).
Variable %EQ %BOND %OTHER %PROPERTY Lev FF Size SDCF Fund Horizon Exp
%EQ -0.44 *** -0.30 *** -0.18 *** 0.06 0.21 *** -0.04 -0.01 -0.45 *** 0.27 *** 0.06
%BOND -0.45 *** -0.65 *** -0.11 * 0.21 *** -0.20 *** 0.19 *** 0.10 0.27 *** -0.12 * 0.03
%OTHER -0.24 *** -0.57 *** -0.13 ** -0.29 *** 0.09 -0.12 * -0.12 * 0.07 -0.07 -0.15 **
%PROPERTY -0.21 *** 0.07 -0.14 ** 0.04 -0.14 ** -0.12 * 0.04 0.07 -0.09 0.17 ***
Lev 0.06 0.18 *** -0.23 *** 0.10 0.20 *** 0.39 *** 0.45 *** 0.03 0.13 * 0.41 ***
FF 0.15 ** -0.18 *** 0.08 -0.15 ** 0.19 *** 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.25 *** 0.16 **
Size 0.02 0.19 *** -0.05 0.01 0.38 *** -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.11 *
SDCF -0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.53 *** 0.16 ** 0.10 0.11 * 0.19 *** 0.31 ***
Fund -0.40 *** 0.25 *** 0.15 ** 0.09 0.02 0.13 ** -0.05 0.15 ** -0.26 *** 0.26 ***
Horizon 0.21 *** -0.14 ** -0.06 -0.04 0.22 *** 0.27 *** 0.00 0.34 *** -0.19 *** 0.11 *
Exp 0.06 0.11 * -0.10 0.22 *** 0.53 *** 0.16 ** 0.27 *** 0.38 *** 0.36 *** 0.25 ***
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Table 3.   Effect of IAS 19R on the pension asset allocation (main tests of H1 and H2) 
 
 Panel A: Univariate analysis 
 
%EQ N N Change
Treatment observations 54 54 -3.73 0.235
Control observations 54 54 -2.19 0.546
Difference -1.54 0.10 *
%BONDS N N Change
Treatment observations 54 54 -1.74 0.658
Control observations 54 54 -4.77 0.310
Difference 3.03 0.020 **
27.33 23.60
30.04 27.85
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment Difference (Post-Pre)
Mean Mean p -value
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment Difference (Post-Pre)
Mean Mean p -value
48.27 46.53
47.68 42.91
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Table 3.   Effect of IAS 19R on the pension asset allocation (main tests of H1 and H2) (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis – base model and tests of H1 
Base Model   Tests of H1 
Variable Pred. 
(1)  
DV = %EQ 
(2)  
DV = %BONDS 
(3)  
DV = %EQ   
(4)  
DV = %BONDS 
Intercept ? 9.80 66.61 10.11 67.42 
(0.34) (1.35) (0.37) (1.36) 
Lev - | + 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.15 
(0.37) (0.77) (0.30) (0.68) 
FF 
 + | - 0.14 -0.26 0.15 -0.26 
(2.13) ** (-2.79) *** (2.16) ** (-2.73) *** 
Size 
 + | - -0.33 0.51 -0.21 0.72 
(-0.25) (0.32) (-0.16) (0.44) 
SDCF - | + -2.58 1.70 -2.95 1.39 
(-0.88) (0.47) (-1.01) (0.36) 
Fund ? -0.30 0.19 -0.30 0.18 
(-2.80) *** (1.45) (-2.87) *** (1.28) 
Horizon 
 + | - 2.62 -1.97 2.94 -2.01 
(1.33) (-0.60) (1.49) (-0.60) 
Exp ? 0.09 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 
(1.39) (-0.50) (1.43) (-0.27) 
TREAT ? -1.36 0.88 
(-0.43) (0.22) 
Post - | + -2.84 -4.94 
(-2.82) *** (-3.53) *** 
Post×TREAT - | + -2.46 4.61 
                  
(-3.35) ***   (2.43) ** 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.315 0.286 0.334 0.296 
N 
    216   216   216   216 
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Table 3.   Effect of IAS 19R on the pension asset allocation (main tests of H1 and H2) (cont’d) 
 
 
Table 3 presents analyses examining the effect of the elimination of the corridor method brought about by IAS 19R on the allocation of pension assets. Panel A provides univariate tests of mean differences in 
%EQ and %BONDS across treatment and control firms.  
Panel B presents the regression results of estimating equations (1) and (2). Columns (1) and (2) present the results of estimating equation (1), the base model, for ASSET_ALLOC, where ASSET_ALLOC is 
%EQ
 
and %BONDS, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) present the results of estimating equation (2) for ASSET_ALLOC, where ASSET_ALLOC is %EQ
 
and %BONDS respectively.  
Panel C presents the regression results of estimating equation (3) for ASSET_ALLOC, where ASSET_ALLOC is %EQ
 
and %BONDS for each pension plan characteristic (PP_CHAR), where PP_CHAR is 
either Exp or Fund.  
The first (second) predicted sign refers to the predicted sign of ASSET_ALLOC, where ASSET_ALLOC is %EQ (%BONDS). 
We provide z-statistics in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% level. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (using a two-tailed test). Standard errors are clustered by year and firm.  
Panel C: Multivariate analysis – tests of H2 
PP_CHAR = Exp PP_CHAR = Fund 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variable Pred. DV = %EQ DV = %BONDS   DV = %EQ DV = %BONDS 
Intercept ? 9.49 67.10 10.43 71.97  
(0.33) (1.36) (0.38) (1.50)  
Lev - | + 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.15  
(0.29) (0.71) (0.29) (0.69)  
FF 
 + | - 0.15 -0.27 0.15 -0.26  
(2.14) ** (-2.71) *** (2.15) ** (-2.74) *** 
Size 
 + | - -0.24 0.69 -0.23 0.68  
(-0.18) (0.40) (-0.17) (0.41)  
SDCF - | + -2.89 1.22 -3.09 1.48  
(-1.00) (0.32) (-1.06) (0.38)  
Fund ? -0.30 0.19 -0.31 0.07  
(-2.89) *** (1.33) (-2.82) *** (0.49)  
Horizon 
 + | - 2.92 -1.88 2.98 -1.86  
(1.39) (-0.56) (1.43) (-0.55)  
Exp ? 0.15 -0.11 0.10 -0.02  
(2.04) ** (-0.97) (1.51) (-0.23)  
TREAT ? 0.09 -1.38 -0.88 -6.04  
(0.02) (-0.24) (-0.10) (-0.65)  
TREAT×PP_CHAR ? -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.14  
(-0.61) (0.76) (-0.05) (0.82)  
Post - | + 0.22 -8.86 -2.20 -12.16  
(0.18) (-4.12) *** (-0.80) (-5.93) *** 
Post×PP_CHAR ? -0.11 0.14 -0.01 0.15  
(-6.05) *** (3.43) *** (-0.32) (4.37) *** 
Post×TREAT - | + -6.70 9.08 -6.73 11.41  
   (-5.69) *** (3.33) *** (-4.90) *** (5.19) *** 
Post×TREAT×PP_CHAR ? 0.16 -0.17 0.08 -0.14  
      (4.36) *** (-3.24) *** (3.49) *** (-2.26) ** 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.304 0.336 0.301 
N     216 216   216 216 
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Table 4.   Alternative analyses: Isolating the ‘ERR Effect’ of IAS 19R 
 
Table 4 presents analyses designed to examine the ‘ERR effect’ on the allocation of pension assets. It reports regression results of estimating equation (3) for 
ASSET_ALLOC, where ASSET_ALLOC is %EQ
 
and %BONDS for each pension plan characteristic (PP_CHAR), where PP_CHAR is either Exp or Fund.  
We provide z-statistics in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables have been winso-
rized at the 1% level.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (using a two-tailed test). Standard errors are clustered by year and 
firm.  
   PP_CHAR = Exp PP_CHAR = Fund 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DV = %EQ DV = %BONDS   DV = %EQ   DV = %BONDS 
Variable                  
Intercept  44.54 24.49 33.76 
 
40.08 
 (2.28) ** (0.93) (1.81) * (1.60) 
Lev 
 
0.13 -0.03 0.09 -0.00 
 (0.94) (-0.15) (0.71) (-0.01) 
FF 
 
0.16 -0.06 0.17 -0.08 
 (2.20) ** (-0.57) (2.26) ** (-0.79) 
Size 
 
-4.79 3.52 -4.54 3.39 
 (-5.35) *** (3.50) *** (-5.68) *** (3.64) *** 
SDCF 
 
-2.66 0.80 -2.05 0.35 
 (-0.94) (0.27) (-0.91) (0.13) 
Fund  -0.05 -0.07 0.20 -0.33 
 (-0.55) (-0.60) 
 
(1.51) (-2.16) ** 
Horizon 
 
3.74 1.81 3.81 1.67 
 (1.02) (0.40) (1.07) (0.42) 
Exp  0.17 -0.01 0.05 0.03 
 (2.38) ** (-0.14) (0.99) (0.64) 
TREAT  -14.46 10.34 9.92 -20.62 
 (-3.37) *** (1.82) * (1.16) (-2.01) ** 
TREAT×PP_CHAR  -0.15 0.01 -0.46 0.50 
 (-1.87) * (0.09) (-3.61) *** (3.29) *** 
Post 
 
0.79 1.16 -7.42 7.83 
 (1.12) (1.58) (-4.32) *** (5.60) *** 
Post×PP_CHAR  -0.05 -0.01 0.10 -0.10 
 (-1.50) (-0.52) (4.64) *** (-7.61) *** 
Post×TREAT  1.98 -11.01 7.00 -12.08 
 (1.54) (-7.01) *** (2.75) *** (-5.59) *** 
Post×TREAT×PP_CHAR  -0.03 0.12 -0.10 0.07 
     (-1.36)   (3.32) ***   (-2.90) ***   (1.39)   
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.471 0.154 0.522 0.229 
N    328 328   328   328 
